The political machinery in Baghdad does not move by the will of the voters. It moves by the friction of backroom deals and the heavy hand of external influence. In October 2022, the Iraqi Parliament finally broke a year-long deadlock by electing Abdul Latif Rashid as president. While some outlets mistakenly identified the winner as Nizar Amidi—who actually took the post of Environment Minister—the real story isn't just about the name on the door. It is about the systemic collapse of the post-2003 consensus and the desperate attempts to patch a hull that is taking on water.
Rashid’s ascent marked the end of the longest period of political paralysis since the fall of the Ba'athist regime. For over a year, the country sat in a vacuum. No budget. No new laws. No direction. The street was screaming, quite literally, as supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr stormed the Green Zone. When the dust settled, the "Muhasasa" system—the sectarian power-sharing arrangement—produced a veteran engineer and former minister to occupy the ceremonial but symbolically vital role of the presidency. Discover more on a connected issue: this related article.
The Myth of the Ceremonial President
In the Iraqi constitution, the president is often described as a figurehead. This is a dangerous oversimplification. The presidency is the gatekeeper of the premiership. Without a president, there is no formal mechanism to designate a Prime Minister, meaning the entire executive branch remains in a state of "caretaker" limbo.
The election of Rashid was not a victory for democratic progress. It was a tactical retreat by various factions who realized that total collapse would cost them more than a compromise. Rashid, a British-educated engineer and longtime member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), ran as an independent against the incumbent Barham Salih. This split within the Kurdish camp revealed a deepening fracture in the north that mirrors the chaos in Baghdad. Further reporting by Al Jazeera highlights similar perspectives on this issue.
The Presidency serves as the ultimate "safety valve" for the ethnic and sectarian balance. By tradition, the post goes to a Kurd, the Prime Minister is a Shia, and the Speaker of Parliament is a Sunni. When this balance falters, the entire state stops breathing. Rashid didn't just inherit a palace; he inherited a mandate to prevent civil war between rival Shia militias while managing the increasingly toxic relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and the federal authorities.
The Sadr Factor and the Vacuum of Legitimacy
You cannot discuss the current presidency without discussing the man who isn't there. Muqtada al-Sadr, whose bloc won the most seats in the 2021 election, ordered his 73 MPs to resign in a fit of populist rage. He wanted a "Majority Government" that would exclude his Iranian-backed rivals. He failed.
His exit created a void that the Coordination Framework—a coalition of pro-Iran parties—was all too happy to fill. This is the central tension of the Rashid era. The government was formed not by the winners of the election, but by the survivors of the aftermath. This creates a massive legitimacy gap. When a government represents the interests of the losers and the leftovers, the public stops looking to the ballot box for solutions.
The president’s role in this environment is to act as a bridge. However, the bridge is built on shifting sand. Rashid was propelled to the position with the blessing of the Coordination Framework, which immediately raised questions about his independence. Can a man chosen by a specific faction truly represent the "protector of the constitution" for all Iraqis?
The Oil and Water Problem
The most pressing file on the president’s desk isn't war fallout in the traditional sense of kinetic combat. It is the economic war between Baghdad and Erbil. For decades, the distribution of oil wealth has been the primary source of friction. The KRG has operated its own energy sector, signing independent contracts with international firms, while Baghdad maintains that all oil belongs to the central state.
The Supreme Court in Baghdad previously ruled the KRG’s oil and gas law unconstitutional. This wasn't just a legal ruling; it was a financial execution order. Rashid, having deep roots in the Kurdish political establishment but now sitting in the capital, is expected to navigate this minefield. The stakes are absolute. If the oil deal collapses, the KRG faces bankruptcy, and Baghdad faces a secessionist crisis it cannot afford to manage.
The "war fallout" mentioned by competitors usually refers to the physical scars of the fight against ISIS. But the more insidious fallout is the institutional rot. Iraq’s infrastructure is crumbling not just because of bombs, but because of a kleptocratic system that consumes billions of dollars in oil revenue while providing less than 12 hours of electricity a day to its citizens.
Regional Chess and the Iranian Shadow
Iraq remains the primary theater for the shadow war between Tehran and Washington. This is an uncomfortable reality that many analysts prefer to gloss over. Every major political appointment in Baghdad requires a nod from regional powers.
Rashid’s election was seen by many as a tilt toward Tehran’s interests, given the support he received from the Coordination Framework. However, the Iraqi presidency must also maintain a working relationship with the West to ensure continued security cooperation and access to global financial markets. It is a grueling balancing act. If the president leans too far one way, he risks domestic unrest or international sanctions. If he stays too neutral, he becomes irrelevant.
The geopolitical landscape has shifted. The era of massive U.S. troop presence is over, replaced by a complex web of economic dependencies and militia influence. The president must manage a country where the state does not have a monopoly on the use of force. Armed groups, often with official status as part of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), hold more power in certain provinces than the local police or the national army.
The Currency Crisis and the Street
While the elites in the Green Zone argue over cabinet positions, the average Iraqi is watching the value of the dinar evaporate. The U.S. Treasury’s crackdown on dollar smuggling to Iran and Syria has sent shocks through the Iraqi economy. The president, while not responsible for monetary policy, becomes the face of a state that cannot control its own currency.
This is where the risk of a renewed uprising sits. The 2019 Tishreen protests were not an anomaly; they were a preview. A generation of young Iraqis, born after 2003, has no loyalty to the parties that currently occupy parliament. They see a presidency and a parliament that function as a revolving door for the same elderly elite.
Rashid is in his late 70s. Most of the people he governs are under 25. This demographic disconnect is a ticking time bomb. The youth don't care about the intricacies of Kurdish party rivalries or the historic grievances of the 1990s. They want jobs, clean water, and a future that doesn't involve migrating to Europe on a rubber dinghy.
The Failure of the "Independent" Label
In modern Iraqi politics, the term "independent" has been hollowed out. It is often used as a cloak for candidates who are too controversial to run under their party's banner or as a compromise when two giants cannot agree on who should lead. Rashid ran as an independent, but his lineage and his supporters tell a different story.
True independence in the Iraqi presidency would mean the power to veto laws that promote sectarianism or to push back against the militia-led erosion of state sovereignty. To date, we have seen little evidence of this. The presidency has largely returned to its role as a facilitator for the status quo.
This status quo is characterized by a "service-based" governance model—a polite way of saying that the government buys peace by expanding the public payroll. Iraq has one of the highest rates of public sector employment in the world. As long as oil prices remain high, the system can sustain this. If oil prices dip, the entire edifice of the Iraqi state will face a catastrophic liquidity crisis.
Strategic Realities of the New Term
The administration's focus has shifted toward regional integration, specifically through projects like the "Development Road" intended to link the Gulf to Europe via Iraq. This is an ambitious, perhaps delusional, attempt to transform Iraq into a transit hub. For it to work, the president must oversee a level of internal stability that hasn't existed in fifty years.
The Presidency under Rashid is tasked with reconciling three conflicting versions of Iraq:
- The International Iraq: A country seeking investment, climate change cooperation, and a seat at the global table.
- The Factional Iraq: A collection of fiefdoms where ministries are treated as spoils of war.
- The Popular Iraq: A frustrated, young, and increasingly secular population that views the entire political class as an occupying force.
There is no easy fix for a system designed to be slow and inefficient to prevent any one person from becoming a dictator. The cost of preventing a new Saddam has been the creation of a hydra—a government with many heads, none of which are looking in the same direction.
The election of a president is often framed as a "new chapter." In Iraq, it is more often just a new page in a very long, very repetitive book. Rashid's tenure will be judged not by the speeches he gives at the UN, but by whether he can prevent the next inevitable collision between the Sadrists and the Framework, and whether he can mediate an oil law that keeps the country from splitting in two.
The "war fallout" isn't a ghost of the past. It is the active, corrosive process of a state trying to find its soul while its leaders are busy dividing the treasury. The names in the headlines change, but the math of Baghdad remains the same: power is taken, never given, and the price is always paid by those outside the concrete walls of the Green Zone.
To survive the coming years, the Iraqi presidency must move beyond being a symbol of ethnic representation and become a functional check on the excesses of the parliamentary blocs. If the office remains a mere rubber stamp for the deals made in the dark, the next "deadlock" won't be settled by a vote. It will be settled on the streets.
